A valid signature — on the website and in Adobe.

This is a real production Certificate of Analysis with its cryptographic signature intact. The verify website reports Signature valid; Adobe Acrobat Reader confirms it with a blue banner. Every value on the verify page maps to a real field inside the PKCS#7 signature embedded in the linked PDF.

What a valid signature looks like at verify.purityanalytics.com

When you scan the QR code on a Purity Analytics COA, or open the artifact URL directly, the verify website fetches the COA's status live from the API. For a valid signed artifact, the page renders three signature-related surfaces back-to-back: the status pill, the how-to panel, and the technical-evidence receipts.

Full Purity Analytics verify page for a valid signed COA, showing the product header, test results, COA PDF download button, the green 'Signature valid' status pill, the how-to-verify panel, and the technical evidence receipts.
Full verify page — a real production COA at verify.purityanalytics.com. The green status pill near the bottom and the two panels beneath it are the signature surfaces.
Closeup of the green Signature valid status pill on the verify page, with the dot animation indicating live verification.
Status pill. Says Signature valid with a steady green dot. The text is set by the JavaScript that runs after the page fetches the live verify response — never by the static HTML default.
Closeup of the how-to-verify panel on the verify page, showing the four numbered steps and the blue/yellow/red banner-colour pills.
How-to panel. Walks you through the same Adobe Reader steps shown in Part 2 below — download the PDF, open it in Adobe, look at the banner colour, click the Signature Panel for the details.
Closeup of the technical evidence panel showing the document SHA-256, artifact fingerprint, signed-at timestamp, signing certificate subject, issuer, serial, validity, signature algorithm, TSA URL, and a verified-at timestamp.
Technical evidence. Every value here is a real cryptographic fact about this signed PDF: the document hash the Tier-1 binding just compared against, the exact Sectigo cert that signed it, the algorithm, the timestamp authority. The Verified at timestamp changes every time you refresh — that's how you know the hash check is running live, not cached.

The same COA, opened in Adobe Reader

Browser PDF viewers (Chrome PDFium, Safari Quick Look, Firefox PDF.js) parse the document but skip cryptographic signature validation entirely. To actually see the signature and have its trust chain validated, the PDF needs to open in Adobe Acrobat Reader (free), Adobe Acrobat Pro, or another PDF tool with PKCS#7 support.

Adobe Acrobat Reader window showing a Purity Analytics COA. A blue notification banner across the top of the document reads 'Signed and all signatures are valid.'
Step 1 — the trust banner. The moment Adobe opens the file it validates the embedded signature against its Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL) root bundle. A blue banner — "Signed and all signatures are valid" — means the document has not been modified since signing AND the certificate chains to a trusted root.
Adobe Acrobat Reader with the Signatures side panel open on the right, listing 'Rev. 1: Signed by Purity Analytics LLC' next to a green validity icon. The Signature Panel button is visible at the top of the blue trust banner.
Step 2 — the Signatures side panel. Click the Signature Panel button on the right of the blue banner (or open View → Show/Hide → Side Panels → Signatures) to reveal the per-signature validation summary. Adobe lists each signature in the document, who signed it, and a coloured icon showing the result of every PKCS#7 sub-check it ran. For a full forensic record — cert serial, validity window, issuer chain, TSA token — right-click the signature → Show Signature Properties. Every value Adobe shows there matches exactly what the verify website's Technical evidence panel surfaces (compare in Part 3 below).

Two independent verifications, same answer.

The verify website and Adobe Acrobat Reader do not trust each other. They each parse the PKCS#7 block from the linked PDF independently, recompute the document hash independently, and validate the certificate chain independently. For a valid signed COA they reach the same answer:

verify.purityanalytics.com
Status
Signature valid
Document hash
matches
Cert subject
Purity Analytics LLC
Cert issuer
Sectigo RSA Document Signing CA
Cert serial
80EE 9C34 8214 54C7 0634 6FA6 4888 B1B5
Algorithm
RSA-SHA512
TSA
timestamp.sectigo.com
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Banner
Blue — signatures valid
Document modified
No
Signed by
Purity Analytics LLC
Issuer
Sectigo RSA Document Signing CA
Cert serial
80EE 9C34 8214 54C7 0634 6FA6 4888 B1B5
Algorithm
RSA-SHA512
Signing time
From RFC 3161 TSA token

If either of these surfaces disagreed with the other — or with the third-party Sectigo OCSP responder it consulted under the hood — the verify website would not display the green pill. See what an invalid example looks like next.